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Secret sharing allows a trusted party (the dealer) to distribute a secret to a group of players, who
can only access the secret cooperatively. Quantum secret sharing (QSS) protocols could provide
unconditional security based on fundamental laws in physics. While the general security proof has
been established recently in an entanglement-based QSS protocol, the tolerable channel loss is unfor-
tunately rather small. Here we propose a continuous variable QSS protocol using conventional laser
sources and homodyne detectors. In this protocol, a Gaussian-modulated coherent state (GMCS)
prepared by one player passes through the secure stations of the other players sequentially, and each
of the other players injects a locally prepared, independent GMCS into the circulating optical mode.
Finally, the dealer measures both the amplitude and the phase quadratures of the receiving optical
mode using double homodyne detectors. Collectively, the players can use their encoded random
numbers to estimate the measurement results of the dealer and further generate a shared key. We
prove the unconditional security of the proposed protocol against both eavesdroppers and dishonest
players in the presence of high channel loss, and discuss various practical issues. a
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Secret sharing is a cryptographic primitive with im-
portant practical applications [1, 2]. In this protocol,
a dealer distributes a secret message M to n players
in such a way that at least k ≤ n players have to
work together to decode the message. This is called a
(k, n)−threshold scheme. In this paper, we will focus
on the (n, n)−threshold secret sharing protocol, which
means all the n players have to work together to decode
the dealer’s message.
If the dealer shares an independent secure key Ki
(i=1,2..n) with each player and the length of each key is
the same as that of the message, then a (n, n)−threshold
scheme can be implemented as follows. The dealer first
generates a new key K = K1⊕K2⊕...⊕Kn where “⊕” de-
notes addition modulo 2, then encodes message M using
K and broadcasts the encrypted message E = M ⊕ K.
Obviously, only when the n players work together can
they determine K and thus decode M from E.
The security of the above scheme relies on the secu-
rity of each individual key. Two-party quantum key dis-
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tribution (QKD) protocols can be employed to generate
unconditional secure keys through insecure channels [3–
6]. The dealer could establish a QKD link with each of
the players and generate n individual keys before running
the secure sharing protocol. However, such an implemen-
tation is rather inefficient for large n. Various quantum
secret sharing (QSS) protocols [7–13] have been proposed
aiming at achieving both proven security and high effi-
ciency.
The security of QSS is deeply connected to that of
QKD. Nevertheless, in contrast to a point-to-point two-
party QKD protocol, a QSS protocol typically involves
more participants and some of them might be dishon-
est. This allows additional hacking strategies and makes
the security analysis of a QSS protocol more demanding
than that of QKD. The application of continuous variable
(CV) QKD techniques to analyze CV-QSS security was
first proposed in [14]. More recently, the security proof of
CV-QSS against both eavesdroppers in the channels and
dishonest players appeared [15]. Like most other QSS
protocols, the protocol studied in [15] is based on mul-
tiparty quantum entanglement which may be difficult to
implement with today’s technology when n is large. Fur-
thermore, the tolerable channel losses presented in [15]
are quite small.
On another front, to ease the implementation difficul-
ties, single qubit sequential QSS protocols have been pro-
posed and experimentally demonstrated [16]. The basic
idea is shown in Fig.1. A single photon prepared in an
initial polarization state propagates from party to party
sequentially. Each party independently applies a ran-
dom BB84-type [17] polarization rotation on the same
photon. Finally, the last recipient performs a polariza-
tion measurement. In half of the cases, the combination
of the basis choices by all the parties results in a deter-
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FIG. 1: Single qubit sequential QSS protocol [16].
ministic measurement result at the last recipient. These
instances could be used to implement secret sharing when
equipped with an appropriate postprocessing procedure.
We remark that a similar design has been proposed and
demonstrated in multiuser QKD [18, 19].
While the above scheme can significantly improve the
feasibility of QSS, its general security is still under de-
bate [20–22]. Furthermore such a design is vulnerable
to Trojan-horse attacks where a malicious eavesdrop-
per could send in multiphoton signals to the polariza-
tion rotation device of the targeted party and unambigu-
ously determine the corresponding polarization rotation
by measuring the output signals. We remark that in the
context of QKD, a similar problem has been investigated
in the so-called “plug-and-play” design [23], where Bob
sends a strong unmodulated laser pulse to Alice through
an insecure channel, who in turn encodes information and
sends it back to Bob after attenuating it to the single-
photon level. Since the laser pulses from Bob to Alice
are strong classical signals, the security issue due to the
bidirectional feature of Alice’s system could be mitigated
by characterizing the light pulses received by Alice using
conventional photodetectors [24, 25]. However, it is more
difficult to apply the same countermeasures in the case
of single qubit sequential QSS, where the attacker can
use a weaker probe signal. This is not only because the
QSS design does not employ an attenuator (as in the
plug-and-play design), but also because the attacker can
make use of both ports of the QSS device rather than
probing and detecting via a single port.
In this paper, we will address both the security and the
practicability of QSS. We propose a CV sequential QSS
protocol based on conventional laser sources and homo-
dyne detectors. The main idea is instead of modulating
the quantum state of a “passing through” photon, each
player injects a locally prepared quantum state into a
circulating optical mode using a beam splitter. This pre-
vents the eavesdroppers to access or interfere the quan-
tum state preparation process and makes our scheme re-
silient to Trojan horse attacks. By choosing an appropri-
ate beam splitting ratio, the additional loss introduced
by each player’s system can be extremely small, mak-
ing the protocol extendable to a large number of players.
Furthermore, by extending the ideas introduced in [15],
we prove the general security of the proposed protocol
against both eavesdroppers and dishonest players in the
presence of high channel loss.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we
present details of the proposed QSS scheme and provide
a general security proof. In Section III, we conduct nu-
merical simulations based on practical system parameters
to show its feasibility. In Section IV, we discuss various
implementation issues and possible extensions.
II. THE PROTOCOL AND ITS SECURITY
Inspired by the single qubit sequential QSS protocol
[16] and the Gaussian-modulated coherent-state (GMCS)
QKD [26], we propose a CV-QSS protocol. As shown in
Fig.2, n players and the dealer are connected by a single
communication channel such as a telecom fiber. For each
quantum transmission, the first player P1 at one end of
the link prepares a coherent state |x1 + ip1〉 and sends
it to the adjacent player P2. Here x1 and p1 are inde-
pendent Gaussian random numbers with zero mean and
a variance of V1N0, where V1 is the modulation variance
chosen by P1, and N0 = 1/4 denotes the shot-noise vari-
ance. The above coherent state passes through a highly
asymmetric beam splitter (with a transmittance tB ∼= 1)
located within the secure station of P2, and continues
its journey to the next player. In the mean time P2 lo-
cally prepares an independent GMCS and couples it into
the same spatiotemporal mode as the signal from P1 via
the second input port of the beam splitter. By carefully
controlling the modulation variances and having knowl-
edge of the reflectivity of the asymmetric beam splitter,
P2 can introduce phase-space displacements of {x2, p2}.
All the other players perform similar operations. At the
end, the quantum state that arrives at the dealer can
be described by |∑nk=1√Tkxk + i∑nk=1√Tkpk〉, where
Tk is the overall transmittance (including losses due to
the channel and the beam splitters) experienced by the
quantum signal from the kth player. The dealer mea-
sures both the amplitude and the phase quadratures of
the received optical mode by performing double homo-
dyne detection. Intuitively, if all the players collaborate
with each other and share the encoded Gaussian ran-
dom numbers, they can acquire a good estimation of the
dealer’s measurement results. This allows the dealer to
generate a secure key which can only be known by the
whole group of n players and not by any subset of them.
The dealer can further use the above key to implement
the (n, n)−threshold secret sharing protocol.
The QSS protocol is summarized as below:
Quantum stage
1. The first player P1 draws a pair of Gaussian random
numbers {x1, p1}, prepares a coherent state |x1 +
ip1〉 and sends it to the adjacent player.
2. Using a highly asymmetric beam splitter, each
player down the link injects a locally prepared
GMCS into the same spatiotemporal mode as the
signal from P1.
33. The dealer measures the amplitude and phase
quadratures of the received optical mode by per-
forming double homodyne detection. The measure-
ment results {xd, pd} are kept as raw data.
4. The above procedure is repeated many times to
generate enough raw data. This completes the
quantum stage of the protocol.
Classical post-processing stage
5. The dealer randomly selects a subset of the raw
data and requests all the players to announce the
corresponding Gaussian random numbers. Com-
bined with the corresponding measurement results,
the channel transmittance {T1, T2, ..., Tn} can be
determined [27]. All the parties discard the dis-
closed data.
6. The dealer assumes P1 is honest and all the other
players are dishonest.
7. The dealer randomly selects a subset of remaining
raw data and requests all the players except P1 to
announce their corresponding raw data.
8. The dealer displaces the measurement results of the
subset in step 7 using xR = xd−
∑n
k=2
√
Tkxk; pR =
pd −
∑n
k=2
√
Tkpk. From {xR, pR} and P1’s raw
data for the same subset, the dealer and P1 esti-
mate a lower bound of secure key rate R1 (in unit
of bits per pulse) of two-party QKD following the
standard postprocessing procedures in the GMCS
QKD [26, 28]. All the parties discard the disclosed
data.
9. Steps 6-8 are repeated n time. In each run, a
different player is selected as the honest player.
At the end, the dealer has n secure key rates
{R1, R2, ..., Rn}.
10. The dealer determines the secure key rate R of the
QSS protocol as the minimum of {R1, R2, ..., Rn},
and generates the final secure key from undisclosed
data using the reverse reconciliation scheme devel-
oped in GMCS QKD [26, 28]. Note that, in re-
verse reconciliation, classical information goes from
the dealer to the players. Accordingly, this process
can be accomplished without the cooperation of the
players. The dealer can implement a QSS protocol
by using the final secure key to encrypt the message
to be shared. Collaboratively, the n players can re-
cover the final secure key (thus the dealer’s mes-
sage) using their Gaussian random numbers and
the classical information announced by the dealer.
Any group of n − 1 (or fewer) players can only
gain an exponentially small amount of information
about the final secure key.
P1 P2 Pn
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FIG. 2: The proposed CV-QSS protocol. L-laser;
M-modulator; BS-beam splitter; HD-double homodyne
detector
The data reconciliation procedure in the last step of
the protocol is the same as that in the standard GMCS
QKD (see [28] and references therein). Note that in the
above protocol, we have implicitly assumed that all the
parties share a phase reference. We will discuss how to
establish such a phase reference in Section 4.
The security analysis of a QSS protocol is typically
more involved than that of QKD. The general security
proof against both eavesdroppers in the channels and
dishonest players only appeared recently [15]. In [15],
the dealer prepares a multiparty continuous-variable en-
tangled state, keeps one mode and distributes the other
modes to the players. Homodyne detection is carried
out by each party on the corresponding mode. One im-
portant idea in [15] is to treat the measurement results
announced by the players as input or output from unchar-
acterized devices while the dealer and the corresponding
device are assumed to be trusted. This allows them to ap-
ply the tools developed in one-sided device-independent
QKD [29, 30] to the security analysis of QSS protocol.
Nevertheless, the tolerable channel losses presented in
[15] are quite small.
In this paper, we follow a security proof strategy sim-
ilar to that in [15] by connecting the security of QSS
with that of the underlying two-party QKD. In our CV-
QSS protocol, the dealer needs to generate a secure key
from the measurement results using reverse reconcilia-
tion. The question is at what rate the secure key can
be generated (the lower bound of the secure key rate)
such that only when all the n players work together, can
they recover the dealer’s secure key, while any group of
n − 1 (or fewer) players can only gain an exponentially
small amount of information. The above problem can be
connected to QKD as follows: Imagine that the dealer re-
quests a group of n−1 players to publicly announce their
Gaussian random numbers while the last player (Alice)
keeps her data private. In this case Alice (who holds the
complete information of the n players) should be able to
recover the secure key while the n−1 players do not have
sufficient information for key recovery. This is equivalent
to a two-party QKD problem where two honest users (Al-
4ice and the dealer) try to generate a secure key against
all the other n − 1 players (and potential eavesdroppers
in the channel). So the secure key rate of QSS is the
same as that of QKD and can be calculated using stan-
dard security proofs of QKD (see more details in the next
paragraph). Since Alice is assumed to be honest in the
above picture, it is reasonable to assume the device con-
trolled by her is also trusted. This suggests that we can
use the standard security proof of QKD with trusted de-
vices to evaluate the secure key rate. Since the secure
key of QSS should be secure against any group of n− 1
players, the dealer needs to repeat the above procedure
n times: the dealer evaluates potential secure key rates
of QKD with each individual player (by assuming all the
other players are dishonest) and chooses the smallest one
among them as the secure key rate for QSS (steps 6-9 in
the protocol). This guarantees the security against the
collaborating attacks between the eavesdropper and any
n−1 (or fewer) players. By employing the security proof
of standard QKD, a highly efficient, loss-tolerant QSS
can be achieved. Note that we have adopted a similar
security proof strategy in a recent entanglement based
QSS demonstration [31].
Next we discuss how to evaluate the secure key rate of
QKD between the dealer and a chosen player given that
all the other n − 1 players are dishonest. Here, we use
a security argument similar to the one used in [32]. As
specified in steps 7-8 of the protocol, after the dealer has
decided which player to conduct QKD with, he (or she)
requests all the other players to announce encoded ran-
dom numbers for a randomly chosen subset of the raw
data. The dealer then displaces the corresponding mea-
surement results using xR = xd −
∑n
k=2
√
Tkxk; pR =
pd −
∑n
k=2
√
Tkpk and estimates a lower bound for the
QKD key rate with the player chosen above. Since the
displacement operation commutes with homodyne detec-
tion, instead of displacing the measurement results, the
dealer could perform phase-space displacements before
double homodyne detection. We can further assume this
virtual displacement operation is performed by the n− 1
players outside the dealer’s secure station without weak-
ening the security of the protocol. In this picture, the
actual protocol has been reduced to the standard QKD
where all the operations by the other n− 1 players (and
potential eavesdroppers) are conducted in the channel be-
fore the two QKD users start the postprocessing process.
Thus the standard security proof of the GMCS QKD can
be applied. Note that the above security analysis cov-
ers the cases when the n − 1 players do not execute the
protocol honestly.
Note that in this paper, we have assumed that the
dealer performs homodyne detection while the players
prepare quantum states. In this scenario, the homodyne
detector can be trusted and this allows us to apply the
standard security proof of CV-QKD. Furthermore, we
can apply the trusted detector noise model by assuming
that both the detector efficiency and the detector noise
are well calibrated and out of the adversary’s control.
This approach can typically lead to a better QKD per-
formance and has been widely adopted in long-distance
CV-QKD experiments [26, 33–37]. We will discuss other
possible arrangements in Section 4.
To evaluate the performance of the proposed QSS pro-
tocol, in the next section we conduct numerical simula-
tions based on realistic system parameters.
III. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
We assume that the quantum channel is telecom fiber
with an attenuation coefficient of γ. Numerical simu-
lations are conducted based on a specific configuration:
the fiber length between the dealer (Bob) and the farthest
player (Alice) is L. All the other n − 1 players are dis-
tributed between them with equal separation. According
to step 10 in the protocol, the secure key rate of the QSS
protocol is the smallest secure key rate of two-party QKD
evaluated between the dealer and each player. Given that
each player introduces the same amount of excess noise
(defined as ε0 in the shot-noise unit), the smallest QKD
key rate under normal operation will be the one between
Alice and Bob. This is the key rate we will evaluate
below. Note that to implement the proposed protocol
in practice, the dealer should evaluate a secure key rate
with each player using experimental data, and choose the
smallest one as the secure key rate for QSS.
The asymptotic secure key rate of two-party GMCS
QKD, in the case of reverse reconciliation, is given by
Refs. [33, 38]
R = fIAB − χBE , (1)
where IAB is the Shannon mutual information between
Alice and Bob; f is the efficiency of the reconciliation
algorithm; χBE is the Holevo bound between Eve (in-
cluding external eavesdroppers and the other n− 1 play-
ers) and Bob. IAB and χBE can be determined from the
channel loss, observed noises, and other QKD system pa-
rameters. Note that all the noise terms in this paper are
defined in shot-noise units.
The channel transmittance of the kth player is given
by
Tk = 10
−γlk
10 , (2)
where lk =
n−k+1
n L is the fiber length between the dealer
and the kth player. Here without compromising the prac-
ticability, we have assumed that the transmittance of the
beam splitter at each player’s station is tB ∼= 1.
The excess noise contributed by the kth player, when
referred to the channel input, is given by
εk =
Tk
T1
ε0. (3)
Note that the excess noise is defined as the additional
noise above the vacuum noise associated with non-unity
channel transmittance. Under normal operation (no
5eavesdroppers in the channel), the excess noise is mainly
due to system imperfections, such as detector noise, er-
rors in quantum state preparation, background light, etc.
In (3), ε0 is defined as the variance of the excess noise
from each player. Since the secure key rate given below is
estimated using noises referred to the channel input (at
Alice), we calculate the excess noise from the kth player
by dividing ε0 by the transmittance from Alice to the k
th
player T1Tk .
In the case of conjugate homodyne detection, the noise
added by Bob’s detector (referred to Bob’s input) is given
by [38]
χhet = [1 + (1− ηD) + 2υel]/ηD, (4)
where ηD and υel are the efficiency and noise variance of
Bob’s detector.
The channel-added noise referred to the channel input
is given by
χline =
1
T1
− 1 +
n∑
k=1
εk, (5)
where the term 1T1 − 1 represents vacuum noise due to
the channel loss.
The overall noise referred to the channel input is given
by
χtot = χline +
χhet
T1
. (6)
Since both quadratures can be used to generate the
secure key, the mutual information between Alice and
Bob is given by
IAB = log2
V + χtot
1 + χtot
, (7)
where V = VA+1, and VA is Alice’s modulation variance.
To estimate χBE , we adopt the realistic noise model
where loss and noise of Bob’s detector are assumed to
be trusted and cannot be accessed by the eavesdropper
[26, 33–37]. Under this model, χBE is given by Ref. [33]
χBE =
2∑
i=1
G
(
λi − 1
2
)
−
5∑
i=3
G
(
λi − 1
2
)
, (8)
where G(x) = (x+ 1)log2(x+ 1)− xlog2x.
λ21,2 =
1
2
[
A±
√
A2 − 4B
]
, (9)
where
A = V 2(1− 2T1) + 2T1 + T 21 (V + χline)2, (10)
B = T 21 (V χline + 1)
2. (11)
λ23,4 =
1
2
[
C ±
√
C2 − 4D
]
, (12)
FIG. 3: Simulation results of the secure key rate for
n=2 (solid), n=5 (dash), n=10 (dash dot) and n=20
(dot). Simulation parameters: γ = 0.2 dB/km;
ε0 = 0.01; υel = 0.1; ηD = 0.5; f = 0.95.
FIG. 4: Simulation results of the secure key rate for
n = 10 (dash dot), n = 20 (dot), n = 50 (solid) and
n = 100 (dash). Simulation parameters: γ = 0.2
dB/km; ε0 = 0.001; υel = 0.1; ηD = 0.5; f = 0.95.
where
C =
1
(T1(V + χtot))2
[Aχ2het +B + 1 + 2χhet
(V
√
B + T1(V + χline)) + 2T1(V
2 − 1)],
(13)
D =
(
V +
√
Bχhet
T1(V + χtot)
)2
. (14)
λ5 = 1. (15)
6Simulation parameters are summarized as follows: γ =
0.2 dB/km, ε0 = 0.01, υel = 0.1, ηD = 0.5, and f = 0.95.
The modulation variance VA is numerically optimized at
different fiber lengths. Note that in (1), when VA in-
creases, both the mutual information IAB and Eve’s in-
formation χBE will increase. In the ideal case (no excess
noise and the efficiency of the reconciliation algorithm
f = 1), a larger modulation variance VA always leads
to a higher secure key rate, so the optimal value of VA
would be infinite. When we take into account system im-
perfections and non-unity reconciliation efficiency, χBE
can increase faster than fIAB when VA is above a certain
value. This leads to a finite optimal modulation variance.
It is a common practice to numerically search for the opti-
mal value of VA. In this paper, for simplicity, we assume
all the players use the same VA. The secure key rate
could be further improved by optimizing the modulation
variance for each player separately.
In Fig.3 we present the relations of the secure key
rate and the fiber length at different numbers of players
n=2, 5, 10, and 20. As shown in Fig.3, the QSS proto-
col can be conducted over tens of kilometers of telecom
fiber with a moderate number of players. The perfor-
mance can be further improved by reducing the excess
noise contributed by each player. Fig.4 shows the sim-
ulation results when ε0 = 0.001 and n=10, 20, 50, and
100: the QSS protocol can be conducted over 20 km with
100 players.
IV. DISCUSSION
Comparing with the previous single qubit sequential
QSS scheme [16], the CV-QSS proposed here is naturally
resilient to Trojan horse attacks: the encoding modu-
lators within the secure stations cannot be reached by
the probing signals from external players or the eaves-
dropper. Furthermore, by using highly asymmetric beam
splitters, the additional loss introduced by each player
can be extremely small. This opens the door to large-
scale implementations. As in the case of single qubit
sequential QSS which can be easily changed into a config-
urable multiuser QKD network [19], it should be straight-
forward to implement CV-QKD based on the proposed
CV-QSS design. Below we will address a few practical
issues.
In Section 2, we have implicitly assumed that all the
participants share a phase reference. This allows them to
prepare quantum states and perform homodyne detection
in the same reference frame. One immediate question is
how to establish such a phase reference in practice. One
possible solution is the pilot-aided phase recovery scheme
proposed in CV-QKD [32, 39, 40]. The basic idea is that
the first player generates a classical phase reference pulse
using the same laser for quantum state generation. After
applying a suitable multiplexing scheme (time, frequency,
polarization, or a combination of them), the phase refer-
ence pulse propagates through the same optical path as
FIG. 5: Secure key rates in the presence of phase noise
for n = 20. Simulation results of the secure key rate for
phase noise variance δ = 0 (dot), δ = 10−4 (solid) and
δ = 10−3 (dash dot). Simulation parameters: γ = 0.2
dB/km; ε0 = 0.001 + VAδ; υel = 0.1; ηD = 0.5; f = 0.95.
the quantum signal. Each player down the link (and also
the dealer) splits out a suitable portion of the phase ref-
erence pulse and interferes it with the local laser. This al-
lows each player (and the dealer) to determine the phase
difference φk between the local phase frame and that of
the first player. After the quantum transmission stage,
the n − 1 players and the dealer first correct the raw
data by performing rotation x′k = xk cosφk − pk sinφk;
p′k = xk sinφk + pk cosφk, then they proceed with the
remaining steps of the protocol. This phase recovery
scheme has been successfully demonstrated in CV-QKD
[32, 39, 41, 42].
In practice, the above phase recovery scheme cannot
be implemented perfectly due to system imperfections.
The additional excess noise contributed by each player
can be described by εp = VAδ, where δ is the phase noise
variance (in units of rad2) at each player’s station [32].
This additional noise should be added into ε0 in (3). In
[43], a phase noise of 10−3 was demonstrated experimen-
tally using the scheme proposed in [44]. We expect that a
phase noise of 10−4 could be achieved by further improv-
ing the system. Fig.5 shows the simulation results for
the case of n = 20 players at three different phase noise
levels: δ = 0, 10−4, 10−3. Even in the case of δ = 10−3,
a reasonable performance can still be achieved.
The CV QSS protocol proposed in this paper is based
on the GMCS QKD, which requires each player to gener-
ate Gaussian distributed random numbers and to actively
modulate the output of a local laser using phase and
amplitude modulators. An alternative passive scheme
based on a thermal source has been proposed to simplify
the state preparation process in CV-QKD [45]. Such a
scheme can also be applied in the proposed CV-QSS pro-
tocol. In this case, at each player’s station, the phase and
7amplitude measurements can be carried out with high
precision on the portion of the state that is transmitted
through the asymmetric beam splitter, rather than on
the weaker portion coupled into the quantum channel.
As we noted in Section 2, in this paper we assume
that the dealer performs the homodyne detection. This
arrangement allows us to apply the standard security
proof of CV-QKD and employ the trusted detector noise
model. Can we allow any participant in Fig.2 to be the
dealer? One trivial solution is to let each participant
have both source and detector. The one chosen as the
dealer performs measurement while the others prepare
quantum states. This solution requires modifications in
the quantum transmission stage and needs complicated
system designs and network re-routing. Can we achieve
the same goal by only changing the postprocessing pro-
cedures? Imagining that after the quantum stage, P2 in
Fig.2 decides to be the dealer. P2 could carry out the
remaining steps of the protocol as outlined in Section 2,
with help from the other participants. More specifically,
P2 needs to estimate the potential QKD key rate with
each player under the assumption that all the other play-
ers are dishonest. There are cases when the two trusted
QKD parties prepared quantum states while the mea-
surement was conducted by a dishonest player, a scenario
as in measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD [46].
In these cases, the security proof and key rate formu-
las developed in CV MDI-QKD [47–49] could be applied
directly. We remark that the existing schemes of CV
MDI-QKD require a highly efficient homodyne detector
and are more sensitive to channel losses. We leave the
feasibility of CV-QSS based on CV MDI-QKD for future
study.
In summary, we propose a CV-QSS protocol based on
practical laser sources and homodyne detectors, which is
intrinsically resilient to Trojan horse attacks. By con-
necting the CV-QSS to CV-QKD, we prove its security
against both eavesdroppers and dishonest players in the
presence of high channel loss.
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